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The election of the Commission President in 2014: 
 
What does it tell us about democracy in the European Union?1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
On 15 July 2014 the European Parliament elected Jean Claude Juncker, the former Prime 
Minister of Luxembourg, as the next President of the European Commission.   It was the 
final act in a process which had proved more controversial than the appointment of any 
of Juncker’s predecessors.  His nomination as a candidate on 27 June by the Heads of 
State and Government in the European Council was only agreed after two countries, 
Hungary and the United Kingdom, openly voiced their opposition and explicitly 
requested a vote.  Never had the European Council taken such an important decision by 
majority vote, rather than seeking a consensus acceptable to all.   
 
This paper will suggest that the bitterness of the argument reflects competing views 
about the nature of democracy in the European Union and the way in which it should 
develop.  At one end of the spectrum, are those who argue that democracy in the EU 
resides and can only reside at the national level: the legitimacy of all that the European 
institutions do is entirely dependent on the readiness of Member States to accept their 
decisions; at the other end are those who point to the evolution of the EU and in 
particular, the empowerment of a directly elected Parliament, as an indication that 
democracy can and should develop beyond the nation state level.  Whereas the latter see 
the election of Juncker as a natural development towards a more democratic EU, the 
former see it as an effective coup d’état against the member states, mounted by an 
overweening Parliament.  The future shape of the EU will depend greatly on who wins 
this argument.2 
 
 
The drama of the unexpected 
 
When the Lisbon Treaty came into effect on 1 December 2009, there was a collective 
sigh of relief that the institutional struggles that had marked the previous decade had 
come to an end.  In the aftermath of the failure to ratify a European Constitution, the 
view was widespread in academic and policy-making circles alike that the shape of the 
EU had surely been settled for the foreseeable future and there would be no need for 
further intergovernmental conferences or new constitutional conventions to discuss 
additional treaty revisions.  It would now be possible to concentrate on developing 
policies to show that the Union was about more than institutional bickering and 
tinkering.  
 
                                                        
1
 This paper is based on a keynote lecture given on 25 June 2014 at the opening of the European Integration 
Summer School at the University of Agder.  The contents have been adapted to take account of the election of 
Jean Claude Juncker as President of the European Commission in July after the lecture was given. 
2
  In academia such a stark binary choice has been resisted by those who have argued for a “third way”, distinct 
from both national and supranational versions of single demos polities, which has been christened “demoicracy” 
(see, for example, Nikolaidis (2013)).  The political debate is, however, likely to continue to be articulated 
around the two opposite poles identified here.  
3 
 
In fact, this point of view, although understandable, reflected a profound 
misunderstanding of the way in which the EU works.  Not only did it not reckon with 
major shocks to the system, such as the global economic and financial crisis that 
subsequently translated into the euro-crisis, which obliged all to consider whether new 
policies could be accommodated in the existing structure, it also underestimated the 
scope for institutional change available within the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty.  The 
legal texts do not only bind and constrain EU institutions as well as member states, they 
also offer opportunities for new forms of political action.   
 
One major opportunity of this kind was provided in the Lisbon Treaty by a small 
addition to the text concerning the appointment of the President of the European 
Commission that had (perhaps) miraculously survived the deliberations and drafts 
elaborated during the Convention from 2002 to 2004.  As before, the prerogative of 
proposing a candidate for the post remained in the hands of the European Council but 
under the terms of the new Treaty, it had to do so now, “taking into account the elections 
to the European Parliament and after having held appropriate consultations” (Article 
17(7) of the Treaty on European Union).    
 
It was possible to downplay the importance of this change.  One could argue that the 
phrase only formalised a situation that already existed.  In both 2004 and 2009 the 
European Council had selected José Manuel Barroso as Commission President designate 
after the European People’s Party (EPP) had won the most seats in the European 
Parliament and Barroso’s own party in Portugal  belonged to the EPP.  Hence the phrase 
only imposed on the European Council the obligation to select a candidate from the 
largest party in the European Parliament after the elections.3  Alternatively, one could 
suggest that the phrase left the Heads of State and Government totally free to choose 
whoever they wanted.  “Taking into account” could be interpreted as meaning no more 
under these circumstances than it had meant in earlier years when the Council said it 
would take account of the opinion of the Parliament on legislative issues, promptly 
setting aside parliamentary amendments if it did not find them useful.  
 
However, these interpretations were not the only ones possible.  When Barroso gave his 
State of the Union address to the European Parliament in September 2012, he pointed in 
a very different direction, by calling on the European political parties to present 
candidates for the post of Commission President in advance of the 2014 European 
elections.  He noted that it did not require a Treaty change but would be “a decisive step 
to make the possibility of a European choice offered by these elections even clearer”. 
 
Such a proposal might have gone unnoticed, had it not been for the reaction of the 
European political parties themselves.  Remarkably, during 2013, five of these parties 
set in motion procedures for selecting candidates for Commission President, all of whom 
were known by early March 2014: 
 
-  the European Left party was the first into the field putting forward Alexis Tsipras, the 
leader of the radical Syriza party in Greece, as its candidate in December 2013; 
                                                        
3
  In fact nothing would have prevented there being a competition between various candidates before Lisbon was 
ratified.  Hix (2008) provided a plausible scenario of what could have taken place in 2009 if all the parties had 
chosen candidates as they did in 2014. 
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-  the European Greens organised a primary election amongst four candidates, where 
anyone subscribing to Green ideas was free to participate.  The numbers who took part 
were relatively small (less than 35,000) but it led to the selection of two candidates, a 
German and a French Green, Ska Keller and José Bové.   
-  there was also competition in the European Liberal party between Olli Rehn, the 
Finnish Commissioner, and Guy Verhofstadt, the leader of the Liberal Group in the 
European Parliament and former Belgian Prime Minister.  The former won the support 
of 14 national Liberal leaders and prime ministers but at a conference held in London 
early in February 2014 Verhofstadt was selected after reaching an informal agreement 
with Rehn, which precluded the need for party members to choose between them. 
-  the Party of European Socialists chose Martin Schulz, the President of the European 
Parliament, as its candidate, without a contest, at its Congress in Rome at the end of 
February. 
-  the last party to nominate its candidate was the European People’s Party in Dublin on 
7 March.  There was a vote between Michel Barnier, the French Commissioner, and Jean 
Claude Juncker, which the latter won by 382 votes to 245. 
 
Not all European parties decided to nominate candidates.  The Alliance of Conservatives 
and Reformists, including the British Conservative Party, was a prominent opponent of 
the very system of having lead candidates, a decision which excluded them from the 
open competition that ensued between the six candidates nominated by the five parties.   
 
The candidates proved ready to give electors a chance to compare them.  There were 
three major debates, the first at Maastricht University, the second at the European 
University Institute in Florence and the last at the European Parliament in Brussels, 
between the end of April and the beginning of May 2014.  These events allowed each 
candidate to say what their programme would be, if elected, and to make clear why 
voters should support their particular party.  The level of interest in these debates was 
small outside the Brussels “beltway” but their very existence changed the nature of the 
European election campaign. 
 
Despite their policy differences, all six candidates agreed that the next Commission 
President would be one of them and that the candidate of the party that got the most 
votes in the elections between 22 and 25 May would be entitled to be the first to look for 
an absolute majority of 376 in the European Parliament.  This was dismissed by some as 
fantasy: the European Council would never allow its effective ability to choose who it 
wanted to be President to be eliminated.  In fact, maintaining the status quo proved 
more difficult than accepting a change in the method of electing the Commission 
President.  
 
In the European elections the EPP lost sixty seats (dropping to 220 from 280) but it still 
had a 20 seat advantage over the Socialists.  Inside the Parliament the leaders of the 
political groups that had put forward candidates agreed to call upon the European 
Council to recognise this fact and to invite Jean Claude Juncker to see if he could find an 
absolute majority of at least 376.  This proposal met opposition of various kinds from 
inside the European Council.  Some saw it as a power grab by the Parliament and an 
encroachment on the role of the Heads of State and Government; others, like Cameron, 
went further and argued that it drew completely the wrong conclusions from the 
European election results.  He argued that the growth of eurosceptic forces in the 
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Parliament showed that electors wanted new faces to lead the move for reform inside 
the EU and that they were unhappy with the present state of the institutions, which they 
saw as too bossy and interfering (Cameron, 2014).  
 
As we have seen, the Cameron argument did not win the day.  Once 9 Centre Left leaders 
met in Paris and stated their support for Juncker, a Centre Right politician, it became 
clear that it would be very unlikely that any other candidate would have a chance of 
being elected.  In addition, inside the EPP, despite some hesitations, it was very difficult 
to argue that there should be a different candidate after the national parties had voted 
so decisively in favour of Juncker at the Dublin Congress back in March.  No-one could 
offer an adequate reason for disavowing a candidate who had been supported only three 
months previously.  Moreover, none of the opponents of Juncker could provide the name 
of a plausible counter-candidate.  Possible names, such as Christine Lagarde, the Head of 
the International Monetary Fund, made it clear that she had a job to do and was not 
available.   
 
Before the decision of the European Council of 27 June, there were many who thought 
that there was likely to be an impasse between the Parliament and the European Council 
which could lead to institutional paralysis for several months.  However, the resistance 
to Juncker’s appointment melted away in the days before the vote, leaving the British 
and Hungarian leaders on their own in opposing the nomination.  They were not able to 
muster the blocking minority required to stop the decision and were reduced to 
claiming that the European Council would live to regret what it had decided.  That which 
had seemed unlikely, if not impossible, only six months earlier had come to pass, to the 
utter shock and amazement of many onlookers (for a full account of what happened and 
why, see Peñalver and Priestley, 2015, forthcoming). 
 
 
A ‘democratic drama’ 
 
The battle over Juncker’s election was not just a clash of personalities: it brought to the 
fore the argument over the democratic credentials of the European Union.  One might 
consider that the Lisbon Treaty had resolved this issue by including four Articles on 
Democratic Principles, including the statement that “the functioning of the Union shall 
be founded on representative democracy”.  However, the Articles do not make clear 
whether such representation is expressed through the European Parliament or through 
the national parliaments of the Member States or if both, whether either has any claim to 
precedence in the democratisation of the EU.  This ambiguity can be seen more clearly 
by considering the extent to which the basic shape of a democratic society at national 
level can be transposed to the European level.  The struggle for the Commission 
Presidency was in large part a conflict over the possibility of such a transposition.   
 
At national level within Europe, democratic discourse assumes that elections serve to 
determine who will hold executive office, that elections allow voters to change the policy 
direction taken by those in government and that elections legitimise the exercise of 
power by government.  Until 2014 no-one seriously argued that the European elections 
could strongly influence who holds executive power.  The European Parliament can 
certainly stop individual Commissioners assuming power, as it did as a result of the 
hearings of prospective Commissioners (Buttiglione in 2004 and Jeleva in 2010), but 
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voters had no direct influence over these changes.  Similarly, for all the increases in 
legislative and budgetary powers that the Parliament has gained in the last twenty years, 
it is very difficult to claim that votes cast in the elections have directly influenced the 
direction of EU policy.  The Parliament has certainly shaped policy but not as a direct 
consequence of the ballot box.  And it is hard to see how power exercised by the 
executive at EU level can be legitimised by elections which are totally separate from the 
establishment of that executive.   Even if voters recognise the Parliament as an 
influential body, there has been no reason for them to accept the legitimacy of executive 
action at EU level because of the votes they cast at European elections. 
 
What happened in 2014 called into question all previous assumptions about the role of 
the European elections and opened up the possibility that democracy at European level 
could look more like democracy at national level.  Might voters in future have a chance 
to influence who heads the EU executive and what policies they pursue, as well as being 
more ready to accept that those policies are legitimate?   This heady prospect was as 
attractive to those wishing to reinforce the European level of government as it was 
alarming to those reluctant to see any loosening of the grip of the member states on the 
development of the European Union. 
 
Influencing the shape of the executive 
 
In all European democratic traditions there is an explicit link between the holding of 
elections and the shape of the executive.  Voters see that the outcome of their actions can 
be a change of government and thereby they have a major stake in the political system.  
What we witnessed in the 2014 elections were the first signs of a comparable 
development at European level: 
 
-  Several candidates competed openly for the right to be elected as President of the 
European Commission, rather than one candidate emerging from negotiations between 
governments behind closed doors.    
-  All candidates had to indicate in advance what they would do if elected, thereby 
creating a bond of accountability between them and the electorate rather than offering 
up a programme for action after the elections that no elector was aware of (as Barroso,  
for example, did in 2009).   
-  All candidates accepted in principle that they had to debate with the other candidates 
so that their suitability could be compared rather one candidate emerging to present his 
or her  credentials after the elections, a change that would incidentally have made it very 
difficult for any candidates nominated after the elections by the European Council to 
have won credibility. 
 
The rationale for such a selection process was presented by the author and colleagues 
from a number of universities in a letter published in the Financial Times: 
 
“The open competition that is taking place is adding a new layer of public debate about 
Europe, offering voters a chance to hear and evaluate different recipes for reforming the 
EU.  All the candidates are opening themselves up to public scrutiny in a way that none of 
their predecessors ever had: any other nominee, however worthy, would conveniently 
escape such an examination.  And the electorate is being offered a chance not only to vote 
for their MEP on 22 May but also to shape the character of the executive of the EU.  This is 
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more democratic than leaving the choice of commission president to the whims of a fireside 
chat at a European Council meeting” (Financial Times, 2014). 
 
It was not a line of argument that was readily accepted, particularly in the United 
Kingdom.  There was a powerful counter-blast put forward by those unwilling to accept 
the logic of our letter.   We were reminded that the electorate did not know and could 
not be expected to know that they were voting for Presidential candidates: in no country 
was there any indication on the ballot paper that a vote for a Liberal MEP, for example, 
was also a vote for Guy Verhofstadt as President of the Commission.  In any case, the 
names of all the candidates were very little known outside their own country, making it 
impossible for the vast bulk of the electorate to make any informed judgement about 
whether they should vote for them or not.  And even if they did know who the 
candidates were, they could not necessarily vote for them.  In the UK, for example, the 
EPP effectively does not exist since the Conservative party left it in 2009, with the result 
that no-one in Britain could vote for Juncker.   
 
What those arguing against the candidate experiment also argued was that European 
elections are essentially national affairs, where the outcome is determined by the state 
of the political parties in each country, not by broader European issues.  Hence the first 
places won by UKIP in the UK and by the Front National in France were the product of a 
tide of euro-scepticism in those countries as much as the victory of Renzi’s Democratic 
Party in Italy was the consequence of the success of his first months in office as Prime 
Minister.  By contrast, the European component of the elections remained small, as 
reflected in a level of turnout that slipped to its lowest level since European elections 
had been introduced in 1979.   
 
There are naturally ways to improve the visibility of the candidates across the EU, for 
example, to put their names, or at least that of the European political party that they 
were selected by, on the ballot paper and to make people more aware that European 
elections are also elections about the shape of the European executive.  There is 
certainly some polling evidence to suggest that such changes would make people more 
likely to vote at European elections.    
 
Nevertheless, these changes would be unlikely to alter the resistance of many to such a 
form of democratisation of the EU.  It was widely argued, particularly in the UK, that the 
European Commission needs to be neutral and that more overt politicisation of the 
institution would prevent it from doing its job properly (see, for example, Grabbe and 
Lehne, 2013).  It would no longer be accepted as a mediator between Council and 
Parliament or as an impartial agent in implementing the Treaties.  There would always 
be the suspicion that party political considerations had played a part in the decisions it 
took.  
 
We who signed the letter to the Financial Times argued that this was too purist a view, 
that the Commission was already a political body and that in any case, the President 
would always be surrounded by Commissioners of other political persuasions and could 
not pursue a single party’s agenda.   This difference of appreciation was as much a 
question of values as of analysis.  It is not simply whether it is feasible for the electorate 
to have a say in the composition of the European executive in the way that national 
electorates influence the shape of their governments.  You also have to ask whether such 
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a move is desirable, whether the European level of government should look more like 
the national level.  This value judgement was at the root of the 2014 argument over 
Juncker’s election. 
 
Bringing about policy change 
 
It is a commonplace of domestic political discourse that elections are a means of getting 
rid of a government that you do not like and putting in power a party or parties that will 
introduce different policies.  It is equally clear that at European level, elections do not 
serve this purpose.   The manifestoes of the European political parties have traditionally 
been very bland, reflecting the need to win the support of all national parties.  And once 
elected, MEPs are confronted with proposals that come from the Commission and that 
they can only influence by seeking support from across the political spectrum.  Without 
a stable centre-left or centre-right majority, the obligation is to find acceptable 
consensus.  As a result, it is hard to see the European elections as a way of censuring 
those who were in office and voting in politicians committed to a different course. 
 
There is little doubt that the EU is unlikely to witness a radical shift from the kind of 
consensus building that has stood it in good stead for half a century and that in any case, 
reflects the way in which politics is conducted in many continental countries.  However, 
these elections did open up the possibility of adding an extra component to the way in 
which policy priorities are established.  All the candidates for the post of Commission 
President did come forward with their own ideas for what they would do once elected.  
Verhofstadt, for example, was the only candidate who expressly stated that he would use 
his position as Commission President to propose a Treaty change to move the seat of the 
European Parliament from Strasbourg to Brussels.  It was an obvious way of appealing 
to those voters who disapprove of the Parliament’s “travelling circus” image but also a 
commitment against which he could be subsequently held accountable.    
 
However, the significance of this change has to be put into perspective.  Much of the 
debate about the programme of the Commission for the coming five years still took place 
after the elections.  Juncker, as the potential candidate for President, was obliged to meet 
all the political groups in the European Parliament to persuade them to vote for him.  He 
had to get a minimum of 376 votes and he could not get this only with the support of his 
own EPP party.  The strength of eurosceptic voices and the opposition of the British 
Conservatives meant that it was particularly important for him to get the backing of the 
Socialists.  They for their part were only willing to give him their support if he 
committed to a review of the austerity policies that had marked the last five years.  
Hence his ability to lay down a clear set of policies was limited by the obligation to get 
cross-party support.     
 
It is also important to recognise that the Commission is not a government in the same 
sense as national governments are.  Much of the agenda of the EU is determined by the 
European Council where the President of the Commission sits alongside the Heads of 
State and Government of the 28 Member States.  This proved equally true after this 
year’s European elections.  At the same time as they nominated Juncker as candidate for 
Commission President, the European Council adopted a strategic agenda for the EU, with 
five main objectives.  Although rather general in character, they revealed the 
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determination of the national governments to retain a central role in fixing where the EU 
should go, not leaving it to the Commission and its President. 
 
Nevertheless, the idea of European electors having some influence over the direction of 
policy is a powerful one that will develop further.  If the experiment with Presidential 
candidates is repeated in 2019, and I would suggest that this is very likely, then the 
political parties are likely to devote considerably more energy to identifying candidates 
and developing policy ideas in the two or three years before the elections.  We can 
expect think tanks of left and right to come forward with proposals, and potential 
candidates to float ideas so that the electorate would be better able to understand the 
broad difference between voting for different parties, in European and not just national 
terms.  Indeed David Cameron’s claim that the 2014 elections were a sign that people 
were fed up with Europe meddling in affairs that should be left to national governments 
could be given clearer policy shape, with a Conservative candidate for President fleshing 
out what sort of a non-meddling role she or he would foresee for the Commission 
(assuming, of course, that the UK is still a member!).  
 
Whether you think such a move towards European policy agendas established in 
advance of the elections to the European Parliament is a good thing depends essentially 
on the extent to which you believe the EU can be legitimised by changes at European 
level.  Many do not want to allow strong Commission Presidential candidates with clear 
manifestoes behind them to emerge but it is my contention that the experience of 2014 
will make such a development much more likely at future European elections.  
 
Raising the democratic temperature in the EU 
 
One reason why European elections do not arouse a level of interest comparable to 
national elections is that the electorate do not feel as much is at stake.  Herman Van 
Rompuy, the President of the European Council (until November 2014), put it very 
bluntly: “the difference between the parliament and those who take the real decisions is 
very clear to citizens”.  In other words, the electorate senses that power lies with 
national governments and that the Parliament cannot match this degree of influence on 
the direction of the EU, however significant the increase in its role has been.   
 
Such a stance presupposes that European elections are not linked to the exercise of 
executive power at EU level.  Once one accepts that a link of this kind is conceivable, it is 
possible to open the way to the legitimation of that power, the sense that what is done at 
EU level has been democratically authorised at the ballot box.   Hence the importance of 
seeking to establish the principle that it is the party that wins the most seats in 
European elections that has the right to put forward its candidate as the next President 
of the Commission.  In this way the Parliament can indeed be connected with “real 
decisions”. 
 
The outcome of the struggle over this principle will depend greatly on the degree to 
which people come to care who becomes Commission President.  Traditionally the 
democratic temperature at European elections has been relatively low.  The sense of 
excitement has not been comparable with that for national elections.  Party differences 
have been played out at the national level, with European agendas assuming a very 
limited importance.    
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The events of 2014 showed how a much wider public debate over who should lead the 
Commission could become the norm.  The struggle over whether Juncker should be 
nominated became highly politicised outside the Brussels “beltway”.  The British press, 
in particular, went out of its way to delegitimize his candidature by fair means or foul.  
Most suggested he was a man of the past, when what was needed was a new broom.  
Some went further and tried to establish that his family had a doubtful past during the 
German occupation of Luxembourg in the Second World War.  Ironically, such attacks 
only served to raise the temperature in a way which resembled much more closely a 
national election campaign.  A precedent had been set for moving the choice of 
Commission President outside the corridors of power in Brussels, with very contrasting 
views emerging across Europe.  In Germany, the population, by a large majority, backed 
Juncker as the candidate of the largest party and made it much more difficult for Angela 
Merkel to renege on the backing her party had given him at the March meeting of the 
EPP in Dublin.  
 
It is possible to argue that what happened in 2014 was an anomaly that will not be 
repeated but it is my contention that the European Union rarely undoes a practice once 
it has been established.  The evolution of “codecision” provides a clear example. After 
the European Parliament had been given codecision powers in the Maastricht Treaty, 
there was no question of rowing back and returning exclusive powers over EU 
legislation to national governments.  Whatever the reticence of some governments, 
successive Treaty changes expanded the scope and range of the Parliament’s legislative 
rights, ending up in the Lisbon Treaty by using the term “Ordinary Legislative 
Procedure” to refer to codecision.  It had become a standard part of the EU scenery 
(Rasmussen, Burns and Reh (eds.), 2013). 
 
This change in the Parliament’s powers can be seen as the unexpected consequence of a 
Treaty change and I would suggest that we may be witnessing something similar with 
the case of European political parties.  Article 10(4) of the Treaty on European Union 
states that “political parties at European level contribute to forming European political 
awareness and to the expressing the will of citizens of the Union”.  It is a phrase that 
might have been dismissed and forgotten if the parties had not decided to put 
candidates up for Commission President in 2014.  Instead, they took up the challenge 
and have put national governments in a difficult position.  After all, the member states 
remain masters of the Treaties and included this sentence in the Lisbon Treaty.  Hence 
one can only assume that they wanted the parties to find new ways of expressing the 
will of European citizens.  Unwelcome it may have been but it could not be dismissed as 
contrary to a direction available under the Treaties. 
 
Indeed the continuing institutional development of the European Union will not end 
here: the ‘Spitzenkandidaten’ experiment may well have provided another twist to the 
development of European institutions.  The recognition of the split nature of the 
executive at EU level - with national governments and the Commission operating 
occasionally uneasily alongside each other - could reinforce pressures to improve the 
coherence of governmental action at European level.  Hence it is not impossible, for 
example, to imagine the merger of the post of Commission President with that of 
President of the European Council.  A precedent has been set by the creation of the High 
Representative, who has a foot in both camps, as Vice-President of the Commission and 
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Chair of the Foreign Affairs Council.  Indeed nothing in the Treaties would need to be 
changed to enable such a change to come about: the two posts are not mutually 
exclusive.   
 
Such a change would be seen as revolutionary today but there is a momentum created 
by this year’s events that may be difficult to stop.  If anyone complained that such an 
important post should not be the result of a bargain in the Parliament between parties, 
why not make the post one that is directly elected?  It is obvious that this would raise the 
democratic heat in the Union substantially.  It would create a post whose occupant could 
be seen as a major rival to heads of national governments and yet could they object to 
such a post being subject to direct election?  And would not such a person contribute to 
legitimising what is done at EU level? 
 
I am not suggesting that such a change will necessarily occur but rather that we are 
witnessing a widening of the argument about the democratic credentials of the EU.  The 
old struggle between proponents of the European Parliament and defenders of national 
parliaments is being broadened to a debate about the whole structure of the EU.  The 
advocates of the competition between candidates for Commission President, like me, 
may be over-optimistic about the speed with which change will come about but, equally 
the events of this year have made it extraordinarily difficult to continue to defend 
making such choices behind closed doors (see also, for example, Baldoli et al., 2014; 
Hobolt, 2014).   Disagreement about what can or should legitimise the use of power at 
EU level remains as strong as ever but the context of that disagreement has altered 
radically.    
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The debate that was generated by the election of Jean Claude Juncker is not one where 
either side in the argument about democracy in the EU can claim victory.  It is an 
argument that is inherent to the structure of the EU and will continue to divide political 
opinion.  Nevertheless, the shape of the argument has been changed and issues are 
starting to be discussed that were ignored hitherto, not least what the consequences 
would be of a deeper politicisation of the Commission.  
 
What, for example, would be the impact of taking power away from the European 
Council and creating a system where it is the strength of European political parties that 
starts to weigh more heavily?  Does such a more majoritarian system mean, for example, 
that Germany will inevitably become more influential in determining who exercises 
power at EU level?  Is it possible to imagine that someone from a state like the UK could 
win enough support inside a European political party to be put forward as a prospective 
Commission President?   As Simon Usherwood (2014) has pointed out, at the very least 
it seems unlikely that a candidate could be elected against the wishes of the largest 
country in the EU, particularly where its MEPs have traditionally brought the largest 
delegations into the EPP and Socialist groups in the Parliament.  One might say that this 
is the inevitable result of a more majoritarian system but at least we should be aware of 
its consequences, particularly if the system develops further and the Commission 
President is able to exert more influence over the names and portfolios of her or his 
fellow Commissioners.    
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Perhaps even more important is the question of whether Europeans as a whole, inside 
or outside the Brussels world, are ready for such a change.  Jo Weiler, President of the 
European University Institute, made the point as follows: 
 
“The ideological politicisation of the Commission and, in its wake, the 
politicisation of Europe as a whole, is an entirely new ball game.  It would require 
not only a huge shift in the institutional culture of the institutions of the EU, but 
an adaptation of the political culture of the polity as a whole with not 
insignificant trade-offs.  Are we ready for this first step to veritable democracy?” 
(Weiler, 2014) 
 
The fact that such a question can be posed shows just how significant the election of 
Juncker is to the future of the EU and the balance between national and supranational 
claims for democracy.  
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